Private application access with browser isolation

ABSTRACT

Systems and methods include, responsive to a request to access an application, wherein the application is in one of a public cloud, a private cloud, and an enterprise network, and wherein the user device is remote over the Internet, determining if a user of the user device is permitted to access the application and whether the application should be provided in an isolated browser; responsive to the determining, creating secure tunnels between the user device, an isolation service operating the isolated browser, and the application based on connection information; loading the application in the isolated browser, via the secure tunnels; and providing image content for the application to the user device, via the secure tunnels.

CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATION(S)

The present patent/application is a continuation-in-part of U.S. patentapplication Ser. No. 16/702,889, filed Dec. 4, 2019, and entitled“Cloud-based web content processing system providing client threatisolation and data integrity,” which claims priority to U.S. ProvisionalPatent Application No. 62/823,220, filed Mar. 25, 2019, and entitled“Client security and data integrity system of cloud-based web contentprocessing,” the contents of each are incorporated by reference hereinin their entirety

The present patent/application is a continuation-in-part of U.S. patentapplication Ser. No. 16/800,307, filed Feb. 25, 2020, and entitled“Secure application access systems and methods,” which is a continuationof U.S. patent application Ser. No. 15/986,874, filed May 23, 2018 (nowU.S. Pat. No. 10,616,180, issued Apr. 7, 2020), and entitled “Clientlessconnection setup for cloud-based virtual private access systems andmethods,” which is a continuation-in-part of U.S. patent applicationSer. No. 15/158,153 filed May 18, 2016 (now U.S. Pat. No. 10,375,024,issued Aug. 6, 2019), and entitled “Cloud-based virtual private accesssystems and methods,” the contents of each are incorporated by referenceherein in their entirety.

FIELD OF THE DISCLOSURE

The present disclosure generally relates to computer networking systemsand methods. More particularly, the present disclosure relates tosystems and methods for private application access with browserisolation.

BACKGROUND OF THE DISCLOSURE

The traditional view of an enterprise network (i.e., corporate, private,etc.) included a well-defined perimeter defended by various appliances(e.g., firewalls, intrusion prevention, advanced threat detection,etc.). In this traditional view, mobile users utilize a Virtual PrivateNetwork (VPN), etc. and have their traffic backhauled into thewell-defined perimeter. This worked when mobile users represented asmall fraction of the users, i.e., most users were within thewell-defined perimeter. However, this is no longer the case—thedefinition of the workplace is no longer confined to within thewell-defined perimeter, and with applications moving to the cloud, theperimeter has extended to the Internet. This results in an increasedrisk for the enterprise data residing on unsecured and unmanaged devicesas well as the security risks in access to the Internet. Cloud-basedsecurity solutions have emerged, such as Zscaler Internet Access (ZIA)and Zscaler Private Access (ZPA), available from Zscaler, Inc., theapplicant and assignee of the present application.

ZPA is a cloud service that provides seamless, zero trust access toprivate applications running on the public cloud, within the datacenter, within an enterprise network, etc. As described herein, ZPA isreferred to as zero trust access to private applications or simply azero trust access service. Here, applications are never exposed to theInternet, making them completely invisible to unauthorized users. Theservice enables the applications to connect to users via inside-outconnectivity versus extending the network to them. Users are neverplaced on the network. This Zero Trust Network Access (ZTNA) approachsupports both managed and unmanaged devices and any private application(not just web apps).

Browser (web) isolation is a technique where a user's browser or appsare physically isolated away from the user device, the local network,etc. thereby removing the risks of malicious code, malware,cyberattacks, etc. This has shown to be an effective technique forenterprises to reduce attacks. Also, secure web gateways protect usersand their user devices from infection as well as enforcing enterprisepolicies. For example, cloud-based secure web gateways are deployed tosecure enterprise networks regardless of location. EnterpriseInformation Technology (IT) personnel are moving the deployment ofapplications to the cloud. Thus, secure enterprise applications areavailable to users across the Internet, across different platforms,different locations, trusted and untrusted devices, etc. The traditionaldemarcation points for enterprise networks are disappearing. There is aneed to leverage the benefits of web isolation with private applicationaccess such as ZPA, ZTNA, etc.

BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE DISCLOSURE

The present disclosure relates to systems and methods for privateapplication access with browser isolation. Systems and methods include,responsive to a request to access an application, wherein theapplication is in one of a public cloud, a private cloud, and anenterprise network, and wherein the user device is remote over theInternet, determining if a user of the user device is permitted toaccess the application and whether the application should be provided inan isolated browser; responsive to the determining, creating securetunnels between the user device, an isolation service operating theisolated browser, and the application based on connection information;loading the application in the isolated browser, via the secure tunnels;and providing image content for the application to the user device, viathe secure tunnels.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

The present disclosure is illustrated and described herein withreference to the various drawings, in which like reference numbers areused to denote like system components/method steps, as appropriate, andin which:

FIG. 1 is a network diagram of a cloud-based system 100 offeringsecurity as a service.

FIG. 2 is a network diagram of an example implementation of thecloud-based system.

FIG. 3 is a network diagram of the cloud-based system illustrating anapplication on the user devices with users configured to operate throughthe cloud-based system.

FIG. 4 is a block diagram of a server, which may be used in thecloud-based system, in other systems, or standalone.

FIG. 5 is a block diagram of a user device, which may be used with thecloud-based system or the like.

FIG. 6 is a network diagram of a Zero Trust Network Access (ZTNA)application utilizing the cloud-based system.

FIG. 7 is a network diagram of a VPN architecture for an intelligent,cloud-based global VPN.

FIG. 8 is a flowchart of a VPN process for an intelligent, cloud-basedglobal VPN.

FIG. 9 is a network diagram illustrating the cloud-based system withprivate applications and data centers connected thereto to providevirtual private access through the cloud-based system.

FIG. 10 is a network diagram of a virtual private access network and aflowchart of a virtual private access process implemented thereon.

FIG. 11 is a block diagram of a secure, isolated cloud environment.

FIGS. 12A-12B are flow diagrams of an example user data persistence flowwhen a user accesses the secure and disposable application environment.

FIG. 13 is a flow diagram of an example of native browser integrationwith web isolation and a secure web gateway.

FIG. 14 is a flow diagram of application gating via the secure anddisposable application environment.

FIG. 15 is a flow diagram of a typical web isolation session forillustration purposes.

FIG. 16 is a diagram of web isolation use cases via the cloud system forcloud applications and web content.

FIG. 17 is a flow diagram of web isolation.

FIG. 18 is a flow diagram of application gating.

FIGS. 19A-19H are screenshots of an example of web isolation through asecure web gateway.

FIG. 20 is a flowchart of a process for web isolation and app gating.

FIG. 21 is a diagram of a typical flow for browser isolation with thecloud-based system.

FIG. 22 is a flowchart of a process for private application access withbrowser isolation.

FIG. 23 is a flow diagram of data flow of web isolation with privateapplication access.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE DISCLOSURE

The present disclosure relates to systems and methods for privateapplication access with browser isolation. Also, systems and methods forcloud-based virtual private access of networked applications aredescribed. At a high level, the systems and methods dynamically create aconnection through a secure tunnel between three entities: an end-point,a cloud, and an on-premises redirection proxy. The connection betweenthe cloud and on-premises proxy is dynamic, on-demand and orchestratedby the cloud. A key feature of the systems and methods is its securityat the edge—there is no need to punch any holes in the existingon-premises firewall. The redirection proxy inside the enterprise (onpremises) “dials out” and connects to the cloud as if too were anend-point. This on-demand dial-out capability and tunnelingauthenticated traffic back to the enterprise is a key differentiator ofthe systems and methods.

The paradigm of the virtual private access systems and methods is togive users network access to get to an application, not to the entirenetwork. If a user is not authorized to get the application, the usershould not be able to even see that it exists, much less access it. Thevirtual private access systems and methods provide a new approach todeliver secure access by decoupling applications from the network,instead providing access with a lightweight software connector, in frontof the applications, an application on the user device, a centralauthority to push policy, and a cloud to stitch the applications and thesoftware connectors together, on a per-user, per-application basis.

With the virtual private access, users can only see the specificapplications allowed by policy. Everything else is “invisible” or “dark”to them. Because the virtual private access separates the applicationfrom the network, the physical location of the application becomesirrelevant—if applications are located in more than one place, the useris automatically directed to the instance that will give them the bestperformance. The virtual private access also dramatically reducesconfiguration complexity, such as policies/firewalls in the datacenters. Enterprises can, for example, move applications to Amazon WebServices or Microsoft Azure, and take advantage of the elasticity of thecloud, making private, internal applications behave just like themarketing leading enterprise applications. Advantageously, there is nohardware to buy or deploy because the virtual private access is aservice offering to users and enterprises.

Also, the present disclosure relates to cloud-based web contentprocessing systems and methods for providing client threat isolation anddata integrity. The cloud-based web content processing system eliminatesprocessing of select web content from a local web browser by moving theprocessing of the selected web content from a user's local web browserto a secure and isolated cloud environment, leaving only presentingimages provided to the local web browser and user interface functionsfor interacting with the selected web content (e.g., web applications,secure data systems and the like) with the local system, i.e., webisolation. This serves two main purposes: (1) The user's local computingand network environment is not exposed to potentially malicious webcontent and is isolated from any threats or residual effects that mayresult from processing web content. (2) In the case of confidential orregulated web content, this approach prevents data exfiltration as onlyscreen updating data is provided to the local browser. Because no datais delivered to the local system (e.g., to be processed by web contentthrough the local web browser), none of the confidential or otherwisesensitive data can be retained on the local system. To further reducechances that any content provided to the local web browser (e.g., as animage or graphic file to be presented and the like, that is “pixels” arepresented to the local web browser or application instead of activecontent) can be retained without a trail, a watermark that contains anidentifier of the user may be added to the screen images provided to thelocal web browser.

In an embodiment, the present disclosure includes a web isolationplatform that secures Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) apps from dataexfiltration and shields corporate endpoints from web-borne threats. Itrenders all content in the cloud and sends only passive, safe pixels(i.e., graphics files) to the browser to prevent exfiltration ofconfidential or regulated data from web apps (such as Salesforce (SFDC),Office365 (0365), or Workday) or exposure to malicious web content. ITsecurity professionals gain peace of mind with GDPR and HIPAA complianceand visibility into end-user activity. The web isolation platform runsin the cloud, accessible from any web browser without installation.

In another embodiment, a secure, isolated cloud environment includes arequest handler that receives requests for target web content, such asweb sites, data, applications, and the like. The isolated cloudenvironment processes the targeted content/data/apps with a virtualbrowser engine that renders them and translates the rendered content topassive pixels that are sent to the original requesting web browser(typically an end-user local web browser) while receiving any userkeyboard/mouse interactions from that browser. The redirection ofrequests to the secure, isolated cloud-based environment can beimplemented through an additional external component. Two such examplesinclude:

(1) A secure web gateway responds to a request from the local webbrowser by instructing the client (local web browser) to use a redirectto request certain links/sites/Uniform Resource Locators (URLs)/servicesfrom the isolation platform (e.g., in order to prevent malicious codefrom running on the client).

(2) An Identity Provider-integrated component that is part of theauthentication chain for authorizing the user to access the desiredapplication determines, based on criteria such as type ofendpoint/location/Internet Protocol (IP) address of the user if acertain web application should be opened in the remote, isolatedenvironment instead of the local browser (e.g., in order to prevent dataexfiltration and the like). This component also provides a mechanismthat prevents end-users from bypassing the isolation platform byaccessing these links/sites directly with the local browser, thereforebypassing the isolation platform and its data exfiltration preventionfeatures).

In an embodiment, the isolated cloud environment renders the content inan ephemeral container that is instantiated at runtime for each end-usersession and dynamically adjusts its configuration according topredefined policies. An example of a policy is whether copy/pasting orupload/download between the local user system and the isolated platformis allowed. After the session, the container is destroyed, and no datais persisted (unless otherwise configured by the administrator such asto save the state for a future session). When the data is persisted, itcan be encrypted for additional security.

The isolated cloud environment also has the capability to sharesingle-sign-on sessions originated in the local browser with theisolated environment through configuring mutual trust relationship(s),therefore allowing seamless single sign-on independent of where theoperation occurs (e.g., in the local web browser for some applicationsand in the secure isolated environment for others).

In an embodiment, the isolated cloud environment also has the capabilityto tag end-user browsers with a cryptographically signed cookie whilethey are used from inside a corporate network so that they can bedetected when the user connects externally and use this fact as aconfigurable parameter to determine if isolation is required or not.

In another embodiment, the isolated cloud environment also has thecapability to adapt its rendering engine to the capabilities of smallerdevices, such as tablets or mobile phones, by acquiring the layoutproperties of the device and mirroring these accordingly. The isolatedcloud environment can also include an administration and configurationdashboard that allows customer administrators to deploy the system in aself-service model. It also allows administrators to configure settingsand policies and provides access to reporting and analytics.

Example Cloud-Based System Architecture

FIG. 1 is a network diagram of a cloud-based system 100 offeringsecurity as a service. Specifically, the cloud-based system 100 canoffer a Secure Internet and Web Gateway as a service to various users102, as well as other cloud services. In this manner, the cloud-basedsystem 100 is located between the users 102 and the Internet as well asany cloud services 106 (or applications) accessed by the users 102. Assuch, the cloud-based system 100 provides inline monitoring inspectingtraffic between the users 102, the Internet 104, and the cloud services106, including Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) traffic. The cloud-basedsystem 100 can offer access control, threat prevention, data protection,etc. The access control can include a cloud-based firewall, cloud-basedintrusion detection, Uniform Resource Locator (URL) filtering, bandwidthcontrol, Domain Name System (DNS) filtering, etc. The threat preventioncan include cloud-based intrusion prevention, protection againstadvanced threats (malware, spam, Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), phishing,etc.), cloud-based sandbox, antivirus, DNS security, etc. The dataprotection can include Data Loss Prevention (DLP), cloud applicationsecurity such as via a Cloud Access Security Broker (CASB), file typecontrol, etc.

The cloud-based firewall can provide Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) andaccess controls across various ports and protocols as well as beingapplication and user aware. The URL filtering can block, allow, or limitwebsite access based on policy for a user, group of users, or entireorganization, including specific destinations or categories of URLs(e.g., gambling, social media, etc.). The bandwidth control can enforcebandwidth policies and prioritize critical applications such as relativeto recreational traffic. DNS filtering can control and block DNSrequests against known and malicious destinations.

The cloud-based intrusion prevention and advanced threat protection candeliver full threat protection against malicious content such as browserexploits, scripts, identified botnets and malware callbacks, etc. Thecloud-based sandbox can block zero-day exploits (just identified) byanalyzing unknown files for malicious behavior. Advantageously, thecloud-based system 100 is multi-tenant and can service a large volume ofthe users 102. As such, newly discovered threats can be promulgatedthroughout the cloud-based system 100 for all tenants practicallyinstantaneously. The antivirus protection can include antivirus,antispyware, antimalware, etc. protection for the users 102, usingsignatures sourced and constantly updated. The DNS security can identifyand route command-and-control connections to threat detection enginesfor full content inspection.

The DLP can use standard and/or custom dictionaries to continuouslymonitor the users 102, including compressed and/or SSL-encryptedtraffic. Again, being in a cloud implementation, the cloud-based system100 can scale this monitoring with near-zero latency on the users 102.The cloud application security can include CASB functionality todiscover and control user access to known and unknown cloud services106. The file type controls enable true file type control by the user,location, destination, etc. to determine which files are allowed or not.

For illustration purposes, the users 102 of the cloud-based system 100can include a mobile device 110, a headquarters (HQ) 112 which caninclude or connect to a data center (DC) 114, Internet of Things (IoT)devices 116, a branch office/remote location 118, etc., and eachincludes one or more user devices (an example user device 300 isillustrated in FIG. 5). The devices 110, 116, and the locations 112,114, 118 are shown for illustrative purposes, and those skilled in theart will recognize there are various access scenarios and other users102 for the cloud-based system 100, all of which are contemplatedherein. The users 102 can be associated with a tenant, which may includean enterprise, a corporation, an organization, etc. That is, a tenant isa group of users who share a common access with specific privileges tothe cloud-based system 100, a cloud service, etc. In an embodiment, theheadquarters 112 can include an enterprise's network with resources inthe data center 114. The mobile device 110 can be a so-called roadwarrior, i.e., users that are off-site, on-the-road, etc. Those skilledin the art will recognize a user 102 has to use a corresponding userdevice 300 for accessing the cloud-based system 100 and the like, andthe description herein may use the user 102 and/or the user device 300interchangeably.

Further, the cloud-based system 100 can be multi-tenant, with eachtenant having its own users 102 and configuration, policy, rules, etc.One advantage of the multi-tenancy and a large volume of users is thezero-day/zero-hour protection in that a new vulnerability can bedetected and then instantly remediated across the entire cloud-basedsystem 100. The same applies to policy, rule, configuration, etc.changes—they are instantly remediated across the entire cloud-basedsystem 100. As well, new features in the cloud-based system 100 can alsobe rolled up simultaneously across the user base, as opposed toselective and time-consuming upgrades on every device at the locations112, 114, 118, and the devices 110, 116.

Logically, the cloud-based system 100 can be viewed as an overlaynetwork between users (at the locations 112, 114, 118, and the devices110, 116) and the Internet 104 and the cloud services 106. Previously,the IT deployment model included enterprise resources and applicationsstored within the data center 114 (i.e., physical devices) behind afirewall (perimeter), accessible by employees, partners, contractors,etc. on-site or remote via Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), etc. Thecloud-based system 100 is replacing the conventional deployment model.The cloud-based system 100 can be used to implement these services inthe cloud without requiring the physical devices and management thereofby enterprise IT administrators. As an ever-present overlay network, thecloud-based system 100 can provide the same functions as the physicaldevices and/or appliances regardless of geography or location of theusers 102, as well as independent of platform, operating system, networkaccess technique, network access provider, etc.

There are various techniques to forward traffic between the users 102 atthe locations 112, 114, 118, and via the devices 110, 116, and thecloud-based system 100. Typically, the locations 112, 114, 118 can usetunneling where all traffic is forward through the cloud-based system100. For example, various tunneling protocols are contemplated, such asGeneric Routing Encapsulation (GRE), Layer Two Tunneling Protocol(L2TP), Internet Protocol (IP) Security (IPsec), customized tunnelingprotocols, etc. The devices 110, 116, when not at one of the locations112, 114, 118 can use a local application that forwards traffic, a proxysuch as via a Proxy Auto-Config (PAC) file, and the like. An applicationof the local application is the application 350 described in detailherein as a connector application. A key aspect of the cloud-basedsystem 100 is all traffic between the users 102 and the Internet 104 orthe cloud services 106 is via the cloud-based system 100. As such, thecloud-based system 100 has visibility to enable various functions, allof which are performed off the user device in the cloud.

The cloud-based system 100 can also include a management system 120 fortenant access to provide global policy and configuration as well asreal-time analytics. This enables IT administrators to have a unifiedview of user activity, threat intelligence, application usage, etc. Forexample, IT administrators can drill-down to a per-user level tounderstand events and correlate threats, to identify compromiseddevices, to have application visibility, and the like. The cloud-basedsystem 100 can further include connectivity to an Identity Provider(IDP) 122 for authentication of the users 102 and to a SecurityInformation and Event Management (SIEM) system 124 for event logging.The system 124 can provide alert and activity logs on a per-user 102basis.

FIG. 2 is a network diagram of an example implementation of thecloud-based system 100. In an embodiment, the cloud-based system 100includes a plurality of enforcement nodes (EN) 150, labeled asenforcement nodes 150-1, 150-2, 150-N, interconnected to one another andinterconnected to a central authority (CA) 152. The nodes 150 and thecentral authority 152, while described as nodes, can include one or moreservers, including physical servers, virtual machines (VM) executed onphysical hardware, etc. An example of a server is illustrated in FIG. 4.The cloud-based system 100 further includes a log router 154 thatconnects to a storage cluster 156 for supporting log maintenance fromthe enforcement nodes 150. The central authority 152 provide centralizedpolicy, real-time threat updates, etc. and coordinates the distributionof this data between the enforcement nodes 150. The enforcement nodes150 provide an onramp to the users 102 and are configured to executepolicy, based on the central authority 152, for each user 102. Theenforcement nodes 150 can be geographically distributed, and the policyfor each user 102 follows that user 102 as he or she connects to thenearest (or other criteria) enforcement node 150. Of note, thecloud-based system is an external system meaning it is separate fromtenant's private networks (enterprise networks) as well as from networksassociated with the devices 110, 116, and locations 112, 118.

The enforcement nodes 150 are full-featured secure internet gatewaysthat provide integrated internet security. They inspect all web trafficbi-directionally for malware and enforce security, compliance, andfirewall policies, as described herein, as well as various additionalfunctionality. In an embodiment, each enforcement node 150 has two mainmodules for inspecting traffic and applying policies: a web module and afirewall module. The enforcement nodes 150 are deployed around the worldand can handle hundreds of thousands of concurrent users with millionsof concurrent sessions. Because of this, regardless of where the users102 are, they can access the Internet 104 from any device, and theenforcement nodes 150 protect the traffic and apply corporate policies.The enforcement nodes 150 can implement various inspection enginestherein, and optionally, send sandboxing to another system. Theenforcement nodes 150 include significant fault tolerance capabilities,such as deployment in active-active mode to ensure availability andredundancy as well as continuous monitoring.

In an embodiment, customer traffic is not passed to any other componentwithin the cloud-based system 100, and the enforcement nodes 150 can beconfigured never to store any data to disk. Packet data is held inmemory for inspection and then, based on policy, is either forwarded ordropped. Log data generated for every transaction is compressed,tokenized, and exported over secure Transport Layer Security (TLS)connections to the log routers 154 that direct the logs to the storagecluster 156, hosted in the appropriate geographical region, for eachorganization. In an embodiment, all data destined for or received fromthe Internet is processed through one of the enforcement nodes 150. Inanother embodiment, specific data specified by each tenant, e.g., onlyemail, only executable files, etc., is processed through one of theenforcement nodes 150.

Each of the enforcement nodes 150 may generate a decision vector D=[d1,d2, . . . , dn] for a content item of one or more parts C=[c1, c2, . . ., cm]. Each decision vector may identify a threat classification, e.g.,clean, spyware, malware, undesirable content, innocuous, spam email,unknown, etc. For example, the output of each element of the decisionvector D may be based on the output of one or more data inspectionengines. In an embodiment, the threat classification may be reduced to asubset of categories, e.g., violating, non-violating, neutral, unknown.Based on the subset classification, the enforcement node 150 may allowthe distribution of the content item, preclude distribution of thecontent item, allow distribution of the content item after a cleaningprocess, or perform threat detection on the content item. In anembodiment, the actions taken by one of the enforcement nodes 150 may bedeterminative on the threat classification of the content item and on asecurity policy of the tenant to which the content item is being sentfrom or from which the content item is being requested by. A contentitem is violating if, for any part C=[c1, c2, . . . , cm] of the contentitem, at any of the enforcement nodes 150, any one of the datainspection engines generates an output that results in a classificationof “violating.”

The central authority 152 hosts all customer (tenant) policy andconfiguration settings. It monitors the cloud and provides a centrallocation for software and database updates and threat intelligence.Given the multi-tenant architecture, the central authority 152 isredundant and backed up in multiple different data centers. Theenforcement nodes 150 establish persistent connections to the centralauthority 152 to download all policy configurations. When a new userconnects to an enforcement node 150, a policy request is sent to thecentral authority 152 through this connection. The central authority 152then calculates the policies that apply to that user 102 and sends thepolicy to the enforcement node 150 as a highly compressed bitmap.

The policy can be tenant-specific and can include access privileges forusers, websites and/or content that is disallowed, restricted domains,DLP dictionaries, etc. Once downloaded, a tenant's policy is cacheduntil a policy change is made in the management system 120. The policycan be tenant-specific and can include access privileges for users,websites and/or content that is disallowed, restricted domains, DLPdictionaries, etc. When this happens, all of the cached policies arepurged, and the enforcement nodes 150 request the new policy when theuser 102 next makes a request. In an embodiment, the enforcement node150 exchange “heartbeats” periodically, so all enforcement nodes 150 areinformed when there is a policy change. Any enforcement node 150 canthen pull the change in policy when it sees a new request.

The cloud-based system 100 can be a private cloud, a public cloud, acombination of a private cloud and a public cloud (hybrid cloud), or thelike. Cloud computing systems and methods abstract away physicalservers, storage, networking, etc., and instead offer these as on-demandand elastic resources. The National Institute of Standards andTechnology (NIST) provides a concise and specific definition whichstates cloud computing is a model for enabling convenient, on-demandnetwork access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources(e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that canbe rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort orservice provider interaction. Cloud computing differs from the classicclient-server model by providing applications from a server that areexecuted and managed by a client's web browser or the like, with noinstalled client version of an application required. Centralizationgives cloud service providers complete control over the versions of thebrowser-based and other applications provided to clients, which removesthe need for version upgrades or license management on individual clientcomputing devices. The phrase “Software as a Service” (SaaS) issometimes used to describe application programs offered through cloudcomputing. A common shorthand for a provided cloud computing service (oreven an aggregation of all existing cloud services) is “the cloud.” Thecloud-based system 100 is illustrated herein as an example embodiment ofa cloud-based system, and other implementations are also contemplated.

As described herein, the terms cloud services and cloud applications maybe used interchangeably. The cloud service 106 is any service madeavailable to users on-demand via the Internet, as opposed to beingprovided from a company's on-premises servers. A cloud application, orcloud app, is a software program where cloud-based and local componentswork together. The cloud-based system 100 can be utilized to provideexample cloud services, including Zscaler Internet Access (ZIA), ZscalerPrivate Access (ZPA), and Zscaler Digital Experience (ZDX), all fromZscaler, Inc. (the assignee and applicant of the present application).Also, there can be multiple different cloud-based systems 100, includingones with different architectures and multiple cloud services. The ZIAservice can provide the access control, threat prevention, and dataprotection described above with reference to the cloud-based system 100.ZPA can include access control, microservice segmentation, etc. The ZDXservice can provide monitoring of user experience, e.g., Quality ofExperience (QoE), Quality of Service (QoS), etc., in a manner that cangain insights based on continuous, inline monitoring. For example, theZIA service can provide a user with Internet Access, and the ZPA servicecan provide a user with access to enterprise resources instead oftraditional Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), namely ZPA provides ZeroTrust Network Access (ZTNA). Those of ordinary skill in the art willrecognize various other types of cloud services 106 are alsocontemplated. Also, other types of cloud architectures are alsocontemplated, with the cloud-based system 100 presented for illustrationpurposes.

User Device Application for Traffic Forwarding and Monitoring

FIG. 3 is a network diagram of the cloud-based system 100 illustratingan application 350 on user devices 300 with users 102 configured tooperate through the cloud-based system 100. Different types of userdevices 300 are proliferating, including Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) aswell as IT-managed devices. The conventional approach for a user device300 to operate with the cloud-based system 100 as well as for accessingenterprise resources includes complex policies, VPNs, poor userexperience, etc. The application 350 can automatically forward usertraffic with the cloud-based system 100 as well as ensuring thatsecurity and access policies are enforced, regardless of device,location, operating system, or application. The application 350automatically determines if a user 102 is looking to access the openInternet 104, a SaaS app, or an internal app running in public, private,or the datacenter and routes mobile traffic through the cloud-basedsystem 100. The application 350 can support various cloud services,including ZIA, ZPA, ZDX, etc., allowing the best in class security withzero trust access to internal apps. As described herein, the application350 can also be referred to as a connector application.

The application 350 is configured to auto-route traffic for seamlessuser experience. This can be protocol as well as application-specific,and the application 350 can route traffic with a nearest or best fitenforcement node 150. Further, the application 350 can detect trustednetworks, allowed applications, etc. and support secure network access.The application 350 can also support the enrollment of the user device300 prior to accessing applications. The application 350 can uniquelydetect the users 102 based on fingerprinting the user device 300, usingcriteria like device model, platform, operating system, etc. Theapplication 350 can support Mobile Device Management (MDM) functions,allowing IT personnel to deploy and manage the user devices 300seamlessly. This can also include the automatic installation of clientand SSL certificates during enrollment. Finally, the application 350provides visibility into device and app usage of the user 102 of theuser device 300.

The application 350 supports a secure, lightweight tunnel between theuser device 300 and the cloud-based system 100. For example, thelightweight tunnel can be HTTP-based. With the application 350, there isno requirement for PAC files, an IPSec VPN, authentication cookies, oruser 102 setup.

Example Server Architecture

FIG. 4 is a block diagram of a server 200, which may be used in thecloud-based system 100, in other systems, or standalone. For example,the enforcement nodes 150 and the central authority 152 may be formed asone or more of the servers 200. The server 200 may be a digital computerthat, in terms of hardware architecture, generally includes a processor202, input/output (I/O) interfaces 204, a network interface 206, a datastore 208, and memory 210. It should be appreciated by those of ordinaryskill in the art that FIG. 4 depicts the server 200 in an oversimplifiedmanner, and a practical embodiment may include additional components andsuitably configured processing logic to support known or conventionaloperating features that are not described in detail herein. Thecomponents (202, 204, 206, 208, and 210) are communicatively coupled viaa local interface 212. The local interface 212 may be, for example, butnot limited to, one or more buses or other wired or wirelessconnections, as is known in the art. The local interface 212 may haveadditional elements, which are omitted for simplicity, such ascontrollers, buffers (caches), drivers, repeaters, and receivers, amongmany others, to enable communications. Further, the local interface 212may include address, control, and/or data connections to enableappropriate communications among the aforementioned components.

The processor 202 is a hardware device for executing softwareinstructions. The processor 202 may be any custom made or commerciallyavailable processor, a Central Processing Unit (CPU), an auxiliaryprocessor among several processors associated with the server 200, asemiconductor-based microprocessor (in the form of a microchip orchipset), or generally any device for executing software instructions.When the server 200 is in operation, the processor 202 is configured toexecute software stored within the memory 210, to communicate data toand from the memory 210, and to generally control operations of theserver 200 pursuant to the software instructions. The I/O interfaces 204may be used to receive user input from and/or for providing systemoutput to one or more devices or components.

The network interface 206 may be used to enable the server 200 tocommunicate on a network, such as the Internet 104. The networkinterface 206 may include, for example, an Ethernet card or adapter or aWireless Local Area Network (WLAN) card or adapter. The networkinterface 206 may include address, control, and/or data connections toenable appropriate communications on the network. A data store 208 maybe used to store data. The data store 208 may include any of volatilememory elements (e.g., random access memory (RAM, such as DRAM, SRAM,SDRAM, and the like)), nonvolatile memory elements (e.g., ROM, harddrive, tape, CDROM, and the like), and combinations thereof.

Moreover, the data store 208 may incorporate electronic, magnetic,optical, and/or other types of storage media. In one example, the datastore 208 may be located internal to the server 200, such as, forexample, an internal hard drive connected to the local interface 212 inthe server 200. Additionally, in another embodiment, the data store 208may be located external to the server 200 such as, for example, anexternal hard drive connected to the I/O interfaces 204 (e.g., SCSI orUSB connection). In a further embodiment, the data store 208 may beconnected to the server 200 through a network, such as, for example, anetwork-attached file server.

The memory 210 may include any of volatile memory elements (e.g., randomaccess memory (RAM, such as DRAM, SRAM, SDRAM, etc.)), nonvolatilememory elements (e.g., ROM, hard drive, tape, CDROM, etc.), andcombinations thereof. Moreover, the memory 210 may incorporateelectronic, magnetic, optical, and/or other types of storage media. Notethat the memory 210 may have a distributed architecture, where variouscomponents are situated remotely from one another but can be accessed bythe processor 202. The software in memory 210 may include one or moresoftware programs, each of which includes an ordered listing ofexecutable instructions for implementing logical functions. The softwarein the memory 210 includes a suitable Operating System (O/S) 214 and oneor more programs 216. The operating system 214 essentially controls theexecution of other computer programs, such as the one or more programs216, and provides scheduling, input-output control, file and datamanagement, memory management, and communication control and relatedservices. The one or more programs 216 may be configured to implementthe various processes, algorithms, methods, techniques, etc. describedherein.

Example User Device Architecture

FIG. 5 is a block diagram of a user device 300, which may be used withthe cloud-based system 100 or the like. Specifically, the user device300 can form a device used by one of the users 102, and this may includecommon devices such as laptops, smartphones, tablets, netbooks, personaldigital assistants, MP3 players, cell phones, e-book readers, IoTdevices, servers, desktops, printers, televisions, streaming mediadevices, and the like. The user device 300 can be a digital device that,in terms of hardware architecture, generally includes a processor 302,I/O interfaces 304, a network interface 306, a data store 308, andmemory 310. It should be appreciated by those of ordinary skill in theart that FIG. 5 depicts the user device 300 in an oversimplified manner,and a practical embodiment may include additional components andsuitably configured processing logic to support known or conventionaloperating features that are not described in detail herein. Thecomponents (302, 304, 306, 308, and 302) are communicatively coupled viaa local interface 312. The local interface 312 can be, for example, butnot limited to, one or more buses or other wired or wirelessconnections, as is known in the art. The local interface 312 can haveadditional elements, which are omitted for simplicity, such ascontrollers, buffers (caches), drivers, repeaters, and receivers, amongmany others, to enable communications. Further, the local interface 312may include address, control, and/or data connections to enableappropriate communications among the aforementioned components.

The processor 302 is a hardware device for executing softwareinstructions. The processor 302 can be any custom made or commerciallyavailable processor, a CPU, an auxiliary processor among severalprocessors associated with the user device 300, a semiconductor-basedmicroprocessor (in the form of a microchip or chipset), or generally anydevice for executing software instructions. When the user device 300 isin operation, the processor 302 is configured to execute software storedwithin the memory 310, to communicate data to and from the memory 310,and to generally control operations of the user device 300 pursuant tothe software instructions. In an embodiment, the processor 302 mayinclude a mobile optimized processor such as optimized for powerconsumption and mobile applications. The I/O interfaces 304 can be usedto receive user input from and/or for providing system output. Userinput can be provided via, for example, a keypad, a touch screen, ascroll ball, a scroll bar, buttons, a barcode scanner, and the like.System output can be provided via a display device such as a LiquidCrystal Display (LCD), touch screen, and the like.

The network interface 306 enables wireless communication to an externalaccess device or network. Any number of suitable wireless datacommunication protocols, techniques, or methodologies can be supportedby the network interface 306, including any protocols for wirelesscommunication. The data store 308 may be used to store data. The datastore 308 may include any of volatile memory elements (e.g., randomaccess memory (RAM, such as DRAM, SRAM, SDRAM, and the like)),nonvolatile memory elements (e.g., ROM, hard drive, tape, CDROM, and thelike), and combinations thereof. Moreover, the data store 308 mayincorporate electronic, magnetic, optical, and/or other types of storagemedia.

The memory 310 may include any of volatile memory elements (e.g., randomaccess memory (RAM, such as DRAM, SRAM, SDRAM, etc.)), nonvolatilememory elements (e.g., ROM, hard drive, etc.), and combinations thereof.Moreover, the memory 310 may incorporate electronic, magnetic, optical,and/or other types of storage media. Note that the memory 310 may have adistributed architecture, where various components are situated remotelyfrom one another but can be accessed by the processor 302. The softwarein memory 310 can include one or more software programs, each of whichincludes an ordered listing of executable instructions for implementinglogical functions. In the example of FIG. 3, the software in the memory310 includes a suitable operating system 314 and programs 316. Theoperating system 314 essentially controls the execution of othercomputer programs and provides scheduling, input-output control, fileand data management, memory management, and communication control andrelated services. The programs 316 may include various applications,add-ons, etc. configured to provide end user functionality with the userdevice 300. For example, example programs 316 may include, but notlimited to, a web browser, social networking applications, streamingmedia applications, games, mapping and location applications, electronicmail applications, financial applications, and the like. In a typicalexample, the end-user typically uses one or more of the programs 316along with a network such as the cloud-based system 100.

Zero Trust Network Access Using the Cloud-Based System

FIG. 6 is a network diagram of a Zero Trust Network Access (ZTNA)application utilizing the cloud-based system 100. For ZTNA, thecloud-based system 100 can dynamically create a connection through asecure tunnel between an endpoint (e.g., users 102A, 102B) that areremote and an on-premises connector 400 that is either located in cloudfile shares and applications 402 and/or in an enterprise network 410that includes enterprise file shares and applications 404. Theconnection between the cloud-based system 100 and on-premises connector400 is dynamic, on-demand, and orchestrated by the cloud-based system100. A key feature is its security at the edge—there is no need to punchany holes in the existing on-premises firewall. The connector 400 insidethe enterprise (on-premises) “dials out” and connects to the cloud-basedsystem 100 as if too were an endpoint. This on-demand dial-outcapability and tunneling authenticated traffic back to the enterprise isa key differentiator for ZTNA. Also, this functionality can beimplemented in part by the application 350 on the user device 300. Also,the applications 402, 404 can include B2B applications. Note, thedifference between the applications 402, 404 is the applications 402 arehosted in the cloud, whereas the applications 404 are hosted on theenterprise network 410. The B2B service described herein contemplatesuse with either or both of the applications 402, 404.

The paradigm of virtual private access systems and methods is to giveusers network access to get to an application and/or file share, not tothe entire network. If a user is not authorized to get the application,the user should not be able even to see that it exists, much less accessit. The virtual private access systems and methods provide an approachto deliver secure access by decoupling applications 402, 404 from thenetwork, instead of providing access with a connector 400, in front ofthe applications 402, 404, an application on the user device 300, acentral authority 152 to push policy, and the cloud-based system 100 tostitch the applications 402, 404 and the software connectors 400together, on a per-user, per-application basis.

With the virtual private access, users can only see the specificapplications 402, 404 allowed by the central authority 152. Everythingelse is “invisible” or “dark” to them. Because the virtual privateaccess separates the application from the network, the physical locationof the application 402, 404 becomes irrelevant—if applications 402, 404are located in more than one place, the user is automatically directedto the instance that will give them the best performance. The virtualprivate access also dramatically reduces configuration complexity, suchas policies/firewalls in the data centers. Enterprises can, for example,move applications to Amazon Web Services or Microsoft Azure, and takeadvantage of the elasticity of the cloud, making private, internalapplications behave just like the marketing leading enterpriseapplications. Advantageously, there is no hardware to buy or deploybecause the virtual private access is a service offering to end-usersand enterprises.

VPN Architecture

FIG. 7 is a network diagram of a VPN architecture 405 for anintelligent, cloud-based global VPN. For illustration purposes, the VPNarchitecture 405 includes the cloud-based system 100, the Internet 104,the applications 402 in SaaS/public cloud systems, and the enterprisenetwork 410. The VPN architecture 405 also includes a user 102, whichcan include any computing device/platform connecting to the cloud-basedsystem 100, the Internet 104, the applications 402, and the enterprisenetwork 410. The VPN architecture 405 includes a single user 102 forillustration purposes, but those of ordinary skill in the art willrecognize that the VPN architecture 405 contemplates a plurality ofusers 102. The user 102 can be a nomadic user, a regional/branch office,etc. That is, the user 102 can be any user of the enterprise network 410that is physically located outside a firewall 412 associated with theenterprise network 410. The SaaS/public cloud systems can include anysystems containing computing and data assets in the cloud such as, forexample, Microsoft OneDrive, Google Drive, Dropbox, Apple iCloud,Customer Relationship Management (CRM) systems, SCM, Sales managementsystems, etc. The enterprise network 410 includes local computing anddata assets behind the firewall 412 for additional security on highlyconfidential assets or legacy assets not yet migrated to the cloud.

The user 102 needs to access the Internet 104, the SaaS/public cloudsystems for the applications 402, and the enterprise network 410. Again,conventionally, the solution for secure communication, the user 102 hasa VPN connection through the firewall 412 where all data is sent to theenterprise network 410, including data destined for the Internet 104 orthe SaaS/public cloud systems for the applications 402. Furthermore,this VPN connection dials into the enterprise network 410. The systemsand methods described herein provide the VPN architecture 405, whichprovides a secure connection to the enterprise network 410 withoutbringing all traffic, e.g., traffic for the Internet 104 or theSaaS/public cloud systems, into the enterprise network 410 as well asremoving the requirement for the user 102 to dial into the enterprisenetwork 410.

Instead of the user 102 creating a secure connection through thefirewall 412, the user 102 connects securely to a VPN device 420 locatedin the cloud-based system 100 through a secure connection 422. Note, thecloud-based system 100 can include a plurality of VPN devices 420. TheVPN architecture 405 dynamically routes traffic between the user 102 andthe Internet 104, the SaaS/public cloud systems for the applications402, and securely with the enterprise network 410. For secure access tothe enterprise network 410, the VPN architecture 405 includesdynamically creating connections through secure tunnels between threeentities: the VPN device 420, the cloud, and an on-premises redirectionproxy 430. The connection between the cloud-based system 100 and theon-premises redirection proxy 430 is dynamic, on-demand and orchestratedby the cloud-based system 100. A key feature of the systems and methodsis its security at the edge of the cloud-based system 100—there is noneed to punch any holes in the existing on-premises firewall 412. Theon-premises redirection proxy 430 inside the enterprise network 410“dials out” and connects to the cloud-based system 100 as if too were anend-point via secure connections 440, 442. This on-demand dial-outcapability and tunneling authenticated traffic back to the enterprisenetwork 410 is a key differentiator.

The VPN architecture 405 includes the VPN devices 420, the on-premisesredirection proxy 430, a topology controller 450, and an intelligent DNSproxy 460. The VPN devices 420 can be Traffic (VPN) distribution serversand can be part of the cloud-based system 100. In an embodiment, thecloud-based system 100 can be a security cloud such as available fromZscaler, Inc. (www.zscaler.com) performing functions on behalf of everyclient that connects to it: a) allowing/denying access to specificInternet sites/apps—based on security policy and absence/presence ofmalware in those sites, and b) set policies on specific SaaS apps andallowing/denying access to specific employees or groups.

The on-premises redirection proxy 430 is located inside a perimeter ofthe enterprise network 410 (inside the private cloud or inside thecorporate data center—depending on the deployment topology). It isconnected to a local network and acts as a “bridge” between the users102 outside the perimeter and apps that are inside the perimeter throughthe secure connections 440, 442. But, this “bridge” is always closed—itis only open to the users 102 that pass two criteria: a) they must beauthenticated by an enterprise authentication service 470, and b) thesecurity policy in effect allows them access to “cross the bridge.”

When the on-premises redirection proxy 430 starts, it establishes apersistent, long-lived connection 472 to the topology controller 450.The topology controller 450 connects to the on-premises redirectionproxy 430 through a secure connection 472 and to the cloud-based system100 through a secure connection 480. The on-premises redirection proxy430 waits for instruction from the topology controller 450 to establishtunnels to specific VPN termination nodes, i.e., the VPN devices 420, inthe cloud-based system 100. The on-premises redirection proxy 430 ismost expediently realized as custom software running inside a virtualmachine (VM). The topology controller 450, as part of the non-volatiledata for each enterprise, stores the network topology of a privatenetwork of the enterprise network 410, including, but not limited to,the internal domain name(s), subnet(s) and other routing information.

The DNS proxy 460 handles all domain names to Internet Protocol (IP)Address resolution on behalf of endpoints (clients). These endpoints areuser computing devices—such as mobile devices, laptops, tablets, etc.The DNS proxy 460 consults the topology controller 450 to discernpackets that must be sent to the Internet 104, the SaaS/public cloudsystems, vs. the enterprise network 410 private network. This decisionis made by consulting the topology controller 450 for information abouta company's private network and domains. The DNS proxy 460 is connectedto the user 102 through a connection 482 and to the cloud-based system100 through a connection 484.

The VPN device 420 is located in the cloud-based system 100 and can havemultiple points-of-presence around the world. If the cloud-based system100 is a distributed security cloud, the VPN device 420 can be locatedwith enforcement nodes 150. In general, the VPN device 420 can beimplemented as software instances on the enforcement nodes 150, as aseparate virtual machine on the same physical hardware as theenforcement nodes 150, or a separate hardware device such as the server200, but part of the cloud-based system 100. The VPN device 420 is thefirst point of entry for any client wishing to connect to the Internet104, SaaS apps, or the enterprise private network. In addition to doingtraditional functions of a VPN server, the VPN device 420 works inconcert with the topology controller 450 to establish on-demand routesto the on-premises redirection proxy 430. These routes are set up foreach user on demand. When the VPN device 420 determines that a packetfrom the user 102 is destined for the enterprise private network, itencapsulates the packet and sends it via a tunnel between the VPN device420 and the on-premises redirection proxy 430. For packets meant for theInternet 104 or SaaS clouds, the VPN device 420 can forwards it to theenforcement nodes 150—to continue processing as before or send directlyto the Internet 104 or SaaS clouds.

VPN Process

FIG. 8 is a flowchart of a VPN process 500 for an intelligent,cloud-based global VPN. The VPN process 500 can be implemented throughthe VPN architecture 405. The VPN process 500 includes the user 102connecting to the cloud-based system 100 through authentication (step510). Once the authentication is complete, a VPN is established betweenthe user 102 and a VPN server in the cloud-based system 100 and DNS forthe user 102 is set to a DNS proxy 460 (step 520). Now, the user 102 hasa secure VPN connection to the cloud-based system 100. Subsequently, theuser 102 sends a request to the cloud-based system 100 via the DNS proxy460 (step 530). Here, the request can be anything—request for theenterprise network 410, the Internet 104, the applications 402 in theSaaS/public cloud systems, the applications 404 in the enterprisenetwork 410, etc. The DNS proxy 460 contacts the topology controller 450with the identity of the user and the request (step 540). That is,whenever the user 102 wishes to reach a destination (Internet, Intranet,SaaS, etc.), it will consult the DNS proxy 460 to obtain the address ofthe destination.

For non-enterprise requests, the cloud-based system 100 forwards therequest per policy (step 550). Here, the cloud-based system 100 canforward the request based on the policy associated with the enterprisenetwork 410 and the user 102. With the identity of the user and theenterprise they belong to, the VPN server will contact the topologycontroller 450 and pre-fetch the enterprise private topology. Forenterprise requests, the topology controller 450 fetches a privatetopology of the enterprise network 410, instructs the redirection proxy430 to establish an outbound tunnel to the VPN server, the redirectionproxy 430 establishes the outbound tunnel, and requests are forwardbetween the user 102 and the enterprise network 410 securely (step 560).Here, the DNS proxy 460 works with the topology controller 450 todetermine the local access in the enterprise network 410, and thetopology controller 450 works with the redirection proxy 430 to dial outa secure connection to the VPN server. The redirection proxy 430establishes an on-demand tunnel to the specific VPN server so that itcan receive packets meant for its internal network.

Global VPN Applications

Advantageously, the systems and methods avoid the conventionalrequirement of VPN tunneling all data into the enterprise network 410and hair-pinning non-enterprise data back out. The systems and methodsalso allow the enterprise network 410 to have remote offices, etc.without requiring large hardware infrastructures—the cloud-based system100 bridges the users 102, remote offices, etc. to the enterprisenetwork 410 in a seamless manner while removing the requirement to bringnon-enterprise data through the enterprise network 410. This recognizesthe shift to mobility in enterprise applications. Also, the VPN tunnelon the user 102 can leverage and use existing VPN clients available onthe user devices 300. The cloud-based system 100, through the VPNarchitecture 405, determines how to route traffic for the user 102efficiently—only enterprise traffic is routed securely to the enterprisenetwork 410. Additionally, the VPN architecture 405 removes theconventional requirement of tunneling into the enterprise network 410,which can be an opportunity for security vulnerabilities. Instead, theredirection proxy 430 dials out of the enterprise network 410.

The systems and methods provide, to the user (enterprise user), asingle, seamless way to connect to Public and Private clouds—with nospecial steps needed to access one vs. the other. To the IT Admin, thesystems and methods provide a single point of control and access for allusers—security policies and rules are enforced at a single global cloudchokepoint—without impacting user convenience/performance or weakeningsecurity.

Virtual Private Access Via the Cloud

FIG. 9 is a network diagram illustrating the cloud-based system 100 withprivate applications 402, 404 and data centers 610 connected thereto toprovide virtual private access through the cloud-based system 100. In anaspect, the virtual private access described herein leverages thecloud-based system 100 to enable various users 102 including remoteusers, contractors, partners, business customers, etc., i.e., anyone whoneeds access to the private applications 402, 404 and the data centers610 access, without granting unfettered access to the internal network,without requiring hardware or appliances, and in a seamless manner fromthe users' 102 perspective. The private applications 402, 404 includeapplications dealing with financial data, personal data, medical data,intellectual property, records, etc., that is the private applications404 can be available on the enterprise network 410, but not availableremotely except conventionally via VPN access. Examples of the privateapplications 402, 404 can include Customer Relationship Management(CRM), sales automation, financial applications, time management,document management, etc. Also, the applications 402, 404 can be B2Bapplications or services as described herein.

The virtual private access is a new technique for the users 102 toaccess the file shares and applications 402, 404, without the cost,hassle or security risk of VPNs, which extend network access to deliverapp access. The virtual private access decouples private internalapplications from the physical network to enable authorized user accessto the file shares and applications 402, 404, without the security riskor complexity of VPNs. That is, virtual private access takes the“Network” out of VPNs.

In the virtual private access, the users 102, the file shares andapplications 402, 404, are communicatively coupled to the cloud-basedsystem 100, such as via the Internet 104 or the like. On theclient-side, at the users 102, the applications 402, 404 provision bothsecure remote access and optionally accessibility to the cloud-basedsystem 100. The application 402, 404 establishes a connection to theclosest enforcement node 150 in the cloud-based system 100 at startupand may not accept incoming requests.

At the file shares and applications 402, 404, the lightweight connectors400 sit in front of the applications 402, 404. The lightweightconnectors 400 become the path to the file shares and applications 402,404 behind it, and connect only to the cloud-based system 100. Thelightweight connectors 400 can be lightweight, ephemeral binary, such asdeployed as a virtual machine, to establish a connection between thefile shares and applications 402, 404 and the cloud-based system 100,such as via the closest enforcement node 150. The lightweight connectors400 do not accept inbound connections of any kind, dramatically reducingthe overall threat surface. The lightweight connectors 400 can beenabled on a standard VMware platform; additional lightweight connectors400 can be created in less than 5 seconds to handle additionalapplication instances. By not accepting inbound connections, thelightweight connectors 400 make the file shares and applications 402,404 “dark,” removing a significant threat vector.

The policy can be established and pushed by policy engines in thecentral authority 152, such as via a distributed cluster of multi-tenantpolicy engines that provide a single interface for all policy creation.Also, no data of any kind transits the policy engines. The enforcementnodes 150 in the security cloud stitch connections together, between theusers 102 and the file shares and applications 402, 404, withoutprocessing traffic of any kind. When the user 102 requests anapplication in the file shares and applications 402, 404, the policyengine delivers connection information to the application 350 andapp-side enforcement nodes 150, which includes the location of a singleenforcement nodes 150 to provision the client/app connection. Theconnection is established through the enforcement nodes 150, and isencrypted with a combination of the customer's client and server-sidecertificates. While the enforcement nodes 150 provision the connection,they do not participate in the key exchange, nor do they have visibilityinto the traffic flows.

Advantageously, the virtual private access provides increased securityin that the file shares and applications 402, 404 are visible only tothe users 102 that are authorized to access them; unauthorized users arenot able to even see them. Because application access is provisionedthrough the cloud-based system 100, rather than via a networkconnection, the virtual private access makes it impossible to route backto applications. The virtual private access is enabled using theapplication 350, without the need to launch or exit VPN clients. Theapplication access just works in the background enablingapplication-specific access to individual contractors, business partnersor other companies, i.e., the users 102.

The virtual private access provides capital expense (CAPEX) andoperating expense (OPEX) reductions as there is no hardware to deploy,configure, or maintain. Legacy VPNs can be phased out. Internal IT canbe devoted to enabling business strategy, rather than maintainingnetwork “plumbing.” Enterprises can move apps to the cloud on theirschedule, without the need to re-architect, set up site-to-site VPNs ordeliver a substandard user experience.

The virtual private access provides easy deployment, i.e., putlightweight connectors 400 in front of the file shares and applications402, 404, wherever they are. The virtual private access willautomatically route to the location that delivers the best performance.Wildcard app deployment will discover applications upon request,regardless of their location, then build granular user access policiesaround them. There is no need for complex firewall rules, NetworkAddress Translation issues or policy juggling to deliver applicationaccess. Further, the virtual private access provides seamlessintegration with existing Single Sign-On (SSO) infrastructure.

FIG. 10 is a network diagram of a virtual private access network 700Aand a flowchart of a virtual private access process 750 implementedthereon. The cloud-based system 100 includes three enforcement nodes150A, 150B, 150C, assume for illustration purposes in San Francisco,N.Y., and London, respectively. The user 102 has the application 350executing on the user device 300, which is communicatively coupled tothe enforcement node 150A. The enterprise file share and application402, 404 is communicatively coupled to the enforcement node 150C. Note,there can be direct connectivity between the enforcement nodes 150A,150C, the enforcement nodes 150A, 150C can connect through theenforcement node 150B, or both the user 102 and the enterprise fileshare and application 402, 404 can be connected to the same node 150.That is, the architecture of the cloud-based system 100 can includevarious implementations.

The virtual private access process 750 is described with reference toboth the user 102, the cloud-based system 100, and the enterprise fileshare and application 402, 404. First, the user 102 is executing theapplication 350 on the user device 300, in the background. The user 102launches the application 350 and can be redirected to an enterprise IDprovider or the like to sign on, i.e., a single sign on, without settingup new accounts. Once authenticated, Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)certificate 720 enrollment occurs, between the user 102 and theenforcement node 150A. With the application 350 executing on the userdevice, the user 102 makes a request to the enterprise file share andapplication 402, 404, e.g., intranet.company.com, crm.company.com, etc.(step 752). Note, the request is not limited to web applications and caninclude anything such as a remote desktop or anything handling anystatic Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) or User Datagram Protocol(UDP) applications.

This request is intercepted by the enforcement node 150A and redirectedto the central authority 152, which performs a policy lookup for theuser 102 and the user device 300 (step 754), transparent to the user102. The central authority 152 determines if the user 102 and the userdevice 300 are authorized for the enterprise file share and application402, 404. Once authorization is determined, the central authority 152provides information to the enforcement nodes 150A, 150B, 150C, theapplication 350, and the lightweight connectors 400 at the enterprisefile share and application 402, 404, and the information can include thecertificates 720 and other details necessary to stitch secureconnections between the various devices. Specifically, the centralauthority 152 can create connection information with the bestenforcement nodes 150 for joint connections, from the user 102 to theenterprise file share and application 402, 404, and the unique tokens(step 756). With the connection information, the enforcement node 150Aconnects to the user 102, presenting a token, and the enforcement node150C connects to the lightweight connector 400, presenting a token (step758). Now, a connection is stitched between the user 102 to theenterprise file share and application 402, 404, through the application350, the enforcement nodes 150A, 150B, 150C, and the lightweightconnector 400.

Browser Isolation

Browser (web) isolation is a technique where a user's browser or appsare physically isolated away from the user device, the local network,etc. thereby removing the risks of malicious code, malware,cyberattacks, etc. This has been shown to be an effective technique forenterprises to reduce attacks. Techniques for browser isolation aredescribed in commonly-assigned U.S. patent application Ser. No.16/702,889, filed Dec. 4, 2019, and entitled “Cloud-based web contentprocessing system providing client threat isolation and data integrity,”the contents of which are incorporated by reference herein.Traditionally browser isolation was focused on removing the risks ofmalicious code, malware, cyberattacks, etc. U.S. patent application Ser.No. 16/702,889 describes an additional use case of preventing dataexfiltration. That is, because no data is delivered to the local system(e.g., to be processed by web content through the local web browser),none of the confidential or otherwise sensitive data can be retained onthe local system.

The secure access can interoperate with browser isolation through thecloud-based system 100, to prevent data exfiltration, which is extremelycritical as this is customer-facing data which adds to the sensitivityand liability, and also accessible to external users (customers). Thisfunctionality forces customers to interact with the B2B applications viaan isolated, contained environment.

Secure, Isolated Cloud Environment

FIG. 11 is a block diagram of a secure, isolated cloud environment 1400.The user device 300 includes a native browser 1402 that is configured toconnect, such as via WebSocket channels, to an isolation request service1404 and to display image data received from the isolation requestservice 1404. The native browser 1402 can be any standard HTML5compliant web browser.

A chainable authentication service 1406 can be instantiated into aservice that can be chained and proxy the authentication to anotherthird party authentication service 1408 or can end the chain to a localuser store. When this service 1406 acts as a chain, it typically sitsbetween a Web App 1410 and the third party authentication service 1408and acts as a middleman by checking originating request and forwardingto an Identity Provider based on certain policies available inconfiguration storage 1412. The chainable authentication service 1406can utilize one of the well-known authentication or federation protocols(SAML, OAUTH, OPENID, etc.) and can interact with third-partyauthentication service 1408 that utilize similar protocols. The policiesof this service sit in the configuration storage 1412 and are beingprocessed at runtime based on information embedded in the request URL.

The isolation request service 1404 is an Internet-facing web servicecapable of processing external isolation requests by doing a series ofactions: one such action can be authenticating a user by redirecting tothe chainable authentication service 1406, another action can befetching Configuration policies for the user at runtime by connecting toan Application Programming Interface (API) to retrieve the policies.Policies obtained from the configuration storage 1412 are used toinstantiate a secure and disposable application environment 1420.

A network display server 1422 is a component that is capable offorwarding data coming from a virtual display 1424 inside an OperatingSystem and send it to the network in a given protocol format. It istypically a piece of software that provides connectivity to the displaydriver of an Operating System and lives in the user space of theOperating System. An example of such server can be the Remote DesktopProtocol (RDP) server that lives as a userspace application on top of anexisting X Display in a Linux Operating System and streams the contentof the display over the network.

A management agent 1426 is a component that helps with managing thesecure and disposable application environment 1420 lifecycle andprovisioning mechanisms. The management agent 1426 helps provisioningand auto-configuration of a managed application 1428.

The managed application 1428 can be any application (web or non-web)that is able to run in a managed environment on top of an OperatingSystem. The managed application 1428 is purposely built or modified tobe able to be managed through the management agent 1426. The lifecycleof the application and the provisioning of configuration and policiesdepends on the communication with the management agent 1426. The managedapplication 1428 may or may not have access to an external network.Through a network tunnel may have access to some other internalresources. An example of such an application can be a web browser or aSecure Shell (SSH) client.

The secure and disposable application environment 1420 is a transient,non-persistent, managed, and containerized application experience thatcontains the necessary functions to expose the actual User Interface ofthe managed application 1428 to the outside world using the networkdisplay server 1422. The secure and disposable application environment1420 is managed through the management agent 1426.

A persistent secured storage 1430 is secured storage system that can beused to save user settings or sessions from one session of managedapplication 1428 to another in order to keep a managed application 1428state across user sessions.

The third-party authentication service 1408 is an identity provider orauthentication service capable of speaking a standardized federation orauthentication protocol (such as OpenID, OAuth, SAML) that is able tosecurely authenticate users that it has governance over.

Usage logs 1432 are logs and event data generated by the user whileusing the managed application 1428 on within the secure and disposableapplication environment 1420. The logs and event data pertain to thecapabilities of the managed application 1428 as well as to otheragnostic event information such as geolocation, time and named userdoing the fore mentioned event.

The configuration storage 1412 is a data store exposed to the outsideworld through an API. The datastore persists policies that define howthe chainable authentication service 1406 will work and how the managedapplication experience will behave when a user uses it. In theconfiguration storage 1412, security and behavioral policies areincluded that determine what the user will see, experience, and berestricted to do inside the secure and disposable applicationenvironment 1420. An example of such a policy can be the capability ofcopying content from the managed application 1428 to the user's nativebrowser 1402.

A secure and scalable service environment 1440 can be a collection ofmicroservices that can be deployed in cloud-based environments orcompletely on-premise. Typically, one such environment can be beingserved for each company/customer.

A display protocol translation service 1442 is a service or server thatconverts from a type of display protocol provided by the network displayserver 1422 to a browser-friendly protocol. An example of such servicecan be a translator from Remote Desktop Protocol to an HTML5 compatibleprotocol.

An admin management portal 1444 is a web-based portal for administratorsto manage configurations in the configurations storage 1412 and view themanaged application 1428 usage logs and reporting.

In an embodiment, the secure and disposable application environment 1420can enable the download of files onto the user device and vice versa,based on policy.

FIGS. 12A-12B are flow diagrams of an example user data persistence flowwhen a user accesses the secure and disposable application environment1420. This sequence flow diagram describes the process for persistingcertain user and web app related information (cookies, sessions,settings, etc.) during a web isolation session. For example, once a webisolation session has already been initiated (as per the other sequenceflows), and that the user, through the native browser 1402, interactswith App1 which is rendered by the managed application 1428 which livesinside the secure and disposable application environment 1420.

The management agent 1426 which sits in the secure and disposableapplication environment 1420 alongside the managed application 1428takes a snapshot—at regular intervals or before a logout event of theuser—of the cookies and session that the user has created as part of hisinteraction with App1 in the web isolation session inside the secure anddisposable application environment 1420. This snapshot is encrypted andstored into the persistent secured storage 1430, available for futureuse when necessary.

When the user logs out, the secure and disposable applicationenvironment 1420 is typically being destroyed; therefore, any existingcookies or other user-related information of browsing are beingdestroyed alongside.

At a later date, when the user initiates another web isolation session,by using a different secure and disposable application environment,accesses again App1. The management agent 1426 restores the snapshot ofthe cookies and other user-related information for App1 from thepersistent secured storage 1430 and loads it into the secure anddisposable application environment 1420. As a result, the user willinteract with App1 using the same cookies and settings from the previousisolation session, therefore, achieving a similar experience to that ofa browser that was never closed.

Various operations are now described in an example flow in FIGS. 12A and12B. The user operates the native browser 1402 on the user device 300,and a web isolation request is sent to the isolation request service1404 (step 1501). The web isolation request can be direct from thenative browser 1402, from an intermediate device such as one of theenforcement nodes 150 as a secure web gateway, etc. The isolationrequest service 1404 fetches a configuration for the request from theconfiguration storage 1412 (step 1502). The isolation request service1404 can seek an authentication provider (step 1503) from the chainableauthentication service 1406, which implements an authentication process(step 1504).

Once authenticated, the isolation request service 1404 provisions a newsecure and disposable application environment 1420 (step 1505) andclient-side rendering is loaded on the native browser 1402 (e.g., aJavaScript application) (step 1506). The isolation request service 1404pushes a configuration for the managed application 1428 to themanagement agent 1426 (step 1507). The isolation request service 1404starts rendering a remote display (such as via an HTML5 compliantprotocol) with a display protocol translation server 1442 (step 1508).The display protocol translation server 1442 initiates a platform-nativeremote display session with the network display server 1422 (step 1509)which initiates a virtual display (step 1510).

The management agent 1426 pushes/serves a configuration to the managedapplication 1428 (step 1511). The management agent 1426 starts a managedapplication experience in a virtual display (step 1512). The displayprotocol translation server 1442 performs conversion of native protocolsto HTML5 (step 1513) and sends an HTML5 friendly protocol stream to theisolation request service 1404 (step 1514). The isolation requestservice 1404 provides an authenticated HTML5 WebSocket stream to thenative browser 1402 (step 1515).

At the native browser 1402, the HTML5 WebSocket stream is rendered as anHTML5 friendly protocol into an HTML5 canvas (step 1516). The user typesor navigates to malicioussite.com (step 1517), and this is input to theremote display at the isolation request service 1404 (step 1518). Theisolation request service 1404 inputs this as an HTML5 friendly protocolstream to the display protocol translation server 1442 (step 1519) whichinputs this to the remote display session at the network display service1422 (step 1520).

The managed application 1428 gets the resources from malicioussite.com(step 1521) and renders the malicioussite.com locally in the secure anddisposable application environment 1420 (step 1522). The displayprotocol translation server 1442 takes the rendered malicioussite.comand converts native to HTML5 (step 1523) for an HTML5 friendly protocolstream to the isolation request service 1404 (step 1524). The isolationrequest service 1404 provides the HTML5 friendly protocol stream as anauthenticated HTML5 WebSocket stream to the native browser 1402 (step1525). The native browser 1402 renders the malicioussite.com into anHTML5 canvas (step 1526).

Web Isolation Integration with a Secure Web Gateway

FIG. 13 is a flow diagram of an example of native browser integrationwith web isolation and a secure web gateway 1600. This sequence flowdiagram describes the user experience of a user with the native browser1402 that hits the isolation request service 1404 as a result of histraffic being configured to go through the secure web gateway 1600. Thesecure web gateway 1600 can be an intelligent proxy that may or may notperform Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) inspection and that works at Layer 7(e.g., a Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) proxy, Domain Name System(DNS) proxy, etc.). For example, the secure web gateway 1600 can be oneof the enforcement nodes 150. The secure web gateway 1600 can beconfigured for redirection to the isolation request service 1404 forcertain uncategorized sites, e.g., site1.com and site3.com in FIG. 13.

The flow in FIG. 13 starts when a user accesses site1.com in the nativebrowser 1402 such as in a regular browser tab (step 1601). After theevaluation by the secure web gateway 1600, it is decided that site1.comshould be rendered in isolation and the user is redirected transparentlyto the isolation request service 1404 (step 1602) and the native browser1402 sends an isolation request of site1.com in tab 1 (step 1603). Theisolation request service 1404 then renders an isolated version ofsite1.com in user's native tab (step 1604). As described herein, theisolation request service 1404 sends safe pixels (i.e., graphics) to thenative browser 1402, instead of any code associated with site1.com.

The user is now in isolation and can interact with site1.com (i.e., thesafe pixels). The user clicks on site2.com, which is a link insidesite1.com (step 1605). When the user clicks on site2.com, the managedapplication 1428 evaluates that it needs to open a new tab, so the URLis sent from the isolation request service 1404 stacks back to thenative browser 1402 (step 1606).

The native browser 1402 will open the URL in a new tab, and the requestwill be re-evaluated by the secure web gateway 1600 (step 1607). Thesecure web gateway 1600 decides that site2.com is safe and can berendered directly in the native browser 1402 without isolation (step1608). At this point in time, the user has 2 tabs open, the first tabwith site1.com rendered in isolation and second tab with site2.comrendered directly in the native browser 1402 (step 1609).

The user continues by clicking on a link to site3.com, which is locatedin site2.com (step 1610). The native browser 1402 computes that this URLdoes not require opening a new tab, so it tries to navigate directly toit (step 1611). Being under the incidence of the secure web gateway1600, the native browser 1402 is redirected (step 1612) to an isolationrequest service 404 since site3.com is an uncategorized site (step1613). The content of site2.com now is replaced by the content ofsite3.com in isolation (step 1614).

Application Gating

FIG. 14 is a flow diagram of application gating via the secure anddisposable application environment 1420. In addition to renderinguncategorized or malicious content in isolation, the secure anddisposable application environment 1420 can be used for “applicationgating” where applications are presented in isolation, such as tountrusted user device, in order to protect against data exfiltration.This allows users to access sensitive content, but the content remainsoff the untrusted device, i.e., it is rendered graphically in the secureand disposable application environment 1420 and destroyed once thesession ends. FIG. 14 is a sequence flow diagram of a web applicationthat is gated for access from unmanaged, untrusted devices.

The flow starts when the user accesses a generic web application(“App1”) such as from the native browser 1402 (step 1701). As describedherein, the generic web application can include Office 365, Salesforce,Google Suite, Box, Dropbox, Workday, etc. Another way of accessing thegeneric web application can be from a Single Sign-On (SSO) applicationportal, which also acts as an Identity Provider (IdP). The generic webapplication can be configured to redirect to the chainableauthentication service 1406 by the administrator to detect and gateapplications in unmanaged endpoints. The chainable authenticationservice 1406 is configured to check policies for gating and federateauthentication requests to the original third-party IdP of the user.After the user is redirected to his third party IdP for authentication,the chainable authentication service 1406 will check policies to see ifthis application needs to be gated or not. A policy represents a certaincriteria that the user's endpoint (i.e., the native browser 1402) needsto meet in order for gating to happen or not. An example of suchcriteria can be originating IP Address, e.g., the user is remote. Othercriteria are also contemplated.

Gating web applications in this context means stopping theauthentication flow and completing the final part of it in a webisolation environment; the user's native browser 1402 receives aredirect from the chainable authentication service 1406 to the isolationrequest service 1404 with context needed to complete the authenticationinstead of completing the authentication flow to generic web applicationin the native browser 402. The users' native browser 1402 creates a webisolation session by connecting to the isolation request service 1404.

For example, with app gating, there is a capability to tag/detectendpoint and transparently redirect SaaS apps to isolation using aSecurity Assertion Markup Language (SAM L) proxy.

When the generic web application is gated, access is permitted onlythrough web isolation. The isolation request service 1404 will push theURL of the generic web application to the management agent 1426 which inturn uses it to open the generic web application inside the secure anddisposable application environment 1420 (step 1702). The managedapplication 1428 will now open the generic web application and willrender it in isolation. The user will browse the generic web applicationexperience inside isolation thus any content will remain contained inthe secure and disposable application environment 1420. Duringoperation, the management agent 1426 can periodically encrypt and savethe App1 state and associated data in the persistent secured storage1430 (step 1703).

At some point, the user can initiate a log out of the App1 (step 1704).As described herein, the secure and disposable application environment1420 is destroyed (step 1705). Assume, for example, the user later logsback into the App1 session (step 1706). The App1 state and associateddata can be fetched and decrypted from the persistent secured storage1430 (step 1707) and the management agent 1426 can restore the App1state-based thereon (step 1708). Now, the user can interact with theApp1 in isolation with the same previous settings and state (step 1709).

In another embodiment, assume the native browser 1402 does meet thepolicies enforced by the chainable authentication service 1406 thus thegeneric web application will not need gating and access to it can bedirect without going through isolation. In this scenario, it is beingconsidered that the native browser 1402 is accessing from a trusted,managed endpoint. An example of such a case would be when the user isaccessing from a company's corporate network. In this particular case,the policy could be configured to enforce tagging of the endpoint suchas that, the chainable authentication service 1406 will generate acryptographically secure cookie that will be sent to the user's nativebrowser 1402 as part of the responses and will be used as a taggingmechanism to recognize this particular browser in the following futureinteractions with the chainable authentication service 1406. If thepolicy is configured so, it could allow accesses to generic webapplication directly, not through isolation, if the tag (cookie) ispresent in the request as a mechanism of validation.

Example Web Isolation Session

FIG. 15 is a flow diagram of a typical web isolation session forillustration purposes. FIG. 15 describes the entities and interactionbetween them that are used in the process of establishing a webisolation session from the native browser 1402. The web isolationsession is an application session where one can render the content ofany managed application 1428 and stream back only pixels to the nativebrowser 1402.

In the example of FIG. 15, it is assumed the managed application 1428 isa web browser. The flow starts from the native browser 1402 when anisolation request is being sent to the isolation request service 1404(step 1801). The isolation request can be sent in multiple ways: eitherdirectly if the user wants to access the isolation request service 1404directly or indirectly through a redirect coming from a third partyservice that was configured for isolation. The third-party web servicecan be, for example, the secure web gateway 1600 service that listensfor web requests and redirects to the isolation request service 1404 forthe URLs that are uncategorized or potentially malicious. Anotherpossibility is that an authentication service (such as the chainableauthentication service 1406) is configured based on certain policies toredirect to the isolation request service 1404 (step 1802). Theisolation request service 1404 will fetch the configuration for thisisolation request from a configuration storage 1412 based on certainattributes from the URL of the isolation request.

After fetching the configuration, it will seek the authenticationprovider needed to validate the user's credentials to access theisolation request service 1404. Usually, this authentication provider isthe chainable authentication service 1406, which based on theconfiguration for this isolation request, will redirect to the properthird party authentication service 1752 and complete the authenticationprocess for the user by using one or more consequent web requests basedon the authentication protocol chosen (step 1803). After the user'scredentials have been validated a new secure and disposable applicationenvironment 1420 will be allocated to the end-user by the isolationrequest service 1404 (steps 1804, 1805).

In the same time, a client-side renderer (a JS-based application) willbe served to the native browser 1402 which will be in a wait state,waiting for the secure and disposable application environment 1420 to beinitialized and fully provisioned. The isolation request service 1404will push the configuration for this isolation session to the managementagent 1426 (step 1806), which pushes the URL to the secure anddisposable application environment 1420 (step 1807).

Simultaneously (or right after) the isolation request service 1404 willstart a rendering session using an underlying HTML5 compatible protocolby connecting to the display protocol translation server 1442 (step1808) which in turn will initiate a platform-native display session tothe network display server 1422 residing in the secure and disposableapplication environment 1420. The display protocol translation server1442 serves as a translator service between native display protocol(such as Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP), for example) and an HTML5compatible protocol. The network display server 1422 acts as a localbridge between the native virtual display 1424 and the network bytranslating raw data from the display driver to a network streamableprotocol stream.

Using the Configuration received from the isolation request service1404, the management agent 1426 will now push/present this informationto the managed application 1428 residing in the secure and disposableapplication environment 1420 and will instruct the managed application1428 to start within a virtual display 1424. Simultaneously with thisstart of the managed application 1428, a data stream will now be exposedto the network from the virtual display 1424 (on which the managedapplication 1428 is connected to) through the network display server1422 and will be in turn transformed by the display protocol translationserver 1442 into an HTML5 compatible protocol. The stream reaches backto the isolation request service 404 which instructs the native browser1402 via the JS application to render the HTML5 compatible protocol intonative HTML5 compatible components such as a canvas, using images ofvarious types such as JPG, PNG, or WEBP depending on various factorssuch as network, frame rate, type of content in the screen etc. Thecommunication for the rendering and streaming between the native browser1402 and the isolation request service 1404 is now being done over anauthenticated HTML5 WebSocket.

The end user via the native browser 1402 has now established a webisolation service which streams back pixels from the managed application1428. All the clipboard, keys and mouse operation are now beingtransported via the WebSocket stream through an HTML5 compatibleprotocol and in turn into a native display protocol stream to the remotedisplay session (step 1809). The reverse of the translation happens whenthe communication is being done from the native browser 1402 to themanaged application 1428.

As the user types inside the web isolation session the URL of apotentially malicious website, the website will be rendered inside theremote web isolation session by the managed application 1428 independentof the native browser 1402. Moreover, via the mechanisms of remotedisplay translations mentioned above the actual representation of theremote virtual display will reach the end user native browser 1402 inthe form of an HTML5 compatible stream of pixels.

Web Isolation Use Cases

FIG. 16 is a diagram of web isolation use cases via the cloud system 100for cloud applications 1902 and web content 1904. FIG. 17 is a flowdiagram of web isolation and FIG. 18 is a flow diagram of applicationgating. In an embodiment, the secure, isolated cloud environment 1400and the secure and disposable application environment 1420 can beimplemented via the cloud-based system 100 to service remote users 1906and internal users 1908. As described herein, the remote users 1906 canbe outside an enterprise's network, such as authorized users (employees,contractors, partners, etc.) working at home, on the road, workingremote, etc. The remote users 1906 can be determined via the cloud-basedsystem 100 such as via IP address or other location determinationtechniques. The remote users 1906 can be using non-authorized equipmentas well, such as Bring Your Own Device (BYOD). The internal users 1908can be located inside an enterprise's network and/or with authorizedenterprise hardware.

The cloud-based system 100 can be configured to perform the webisolation techniques described herein for both the cloud applications1902 and the web content 1904. The web isolation techniques can be asdescribed herein with respect to the secure, isolated cloud environment1400 and the secure and disposable application environment 1420. Forexample, the cloud-based system 100 can perform isolation for cloudapplications (“app gating”) for the remote users 1906 to ensure noregulated or otherwise confidential data is uncontrolled. Thecloud-based system 100 can perform isolation for the web content forboth the remote users 1906 and the internal users 1908 to protect fromattacks due to malicious code.

The cloud-based system 100 can select isolation for the app gating ofthe cloud applications 1902 based on location, device type, etc. orother policy considerations. The cloud-based system 100 can furtherselect isolation for the web content 1904 based on whether a particularsite (URL) is uncategorized or previously categorized as malicious.

Secure Web Gateway Use Case

FIGS. 19A-19H are screenshots of an example of web isolation through asecure web gateway 1600. The screenshots in FIGS. 19A-19H are those ofthe native browser 1402. In this example, an employee is on anauthorized device which may or may not be on the enterprise network. InFIG. 19A, the user opens the native browser 1402 with a tab directed toaccess personal email, e.g., mail.yahoo.com. The secure web gateway 1600redirects traffic to isolation, such as due to policy, e.g., accessingpersonal email while at work. Other policies may include accessingsocial media, file shares, etc. while at work. In FIG. 19A, the nativebrowser 1402 appears normal to the user except for a banner notifyingthe user of isolation. The banner can be removed/minimized.

In FIG. 19B, the user accesses an email that has two links. Note, theuser is able to interact with this webpage in the tab even though it isjust graphics (pixels), where the native browser 1402 utilizesWebSocket. The user can click on the link for www.salesforce.com in FIG.19B. Note, in this example, www.salesforce.com is categorized as a safelocation while at work, and this URL is accessed through the nativebrowser 1402 without isolation. Specifically, in FIGS. 19C and 19D,www.salesforce.com is opened in a second tab that is not isolated.

The first tab remains in isolation with the mail page. That is thescreenshots of FIGS. 19C, 19D, and 19E show two tabs with the first tabin isolation and the second tab not in isolation. In FIG. 19E, the userclicks on a new link, lottery.com which is opened in a third tab in FIG.19F in isolation due to policy, e.g., gambling site at work. In FIG.19G, the user signs out of the mail page and in FIG. 19H, the browsergoes outside of isolation.

WebSocket

WebSocket is a protocol, providing full-duplex communication channelsover a single Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) connection. TheWebSocket protocol was standardized by the IETF as RFC 6455 in 2011, andthe WebSocket API in Web IDL is being standardized by the W3C. Thepresent disclosure utilizes the WebSocket protocol for interactionbetween a web browser (or other client application), such as the nativebrowser 1402, and a web server, such as the isolation request service1404. This is made possible by providing a standardized way for theserver to send content to the client without being first requested bythe client and allowing messages to be passed back and forth whilekeeping the connection open. Most browsers support the WebSocketprotocol, including Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge, Internet Explorer,Firefox, Safari, and Opera. The user device can execute a web browserthat loads the image content utilizing a JavaScript application and thatinteracts with the image content by sending keyboard and mouse inputsvia a WebSocket channel.

So, the native browser 1402 only has graphics (pixels) but can interactwith the graphics using WebSocket. Further, the present disclosureincludes a JavaScript layer built on top of a web browser that controlsend-user experience (including policies) within the isolatedenvironment.

Process for Web Isolation and App Dating

FIG. 20 is a flowchart of a process 1950 for web isolation and appgating. The process 1950 can be a computer-implemented method,implemented as instructions stored in a computer-readable medium andexecuted by one or more processors, or by an apparatus such as theenforcement node 150 or the server 200. The process 1950 includesreceiving a request for resources that are one of web content and acloud application from a user device (step 1952); determining therequest requires isolation based on any of policy, category of the webcontent, type of the user device, and location of the user device (step1954); rendering content associated with the request in a secureenvironment that is isolated from the user device (step 1956); andproviding image content based on the content to the user device (step1958).

The web content can be based on a URL, and the determination ofisolation can be based on a category of the URL such as authorized,unauthorized, or unknown (uncategorized). For example, unauthorizedand/or uncategorized URLs can be isolated. The cloud application can bea SaaS application such as Office365, Salesforce, Box, etc. and thedetermination of isolation can be based on the location, the type ofuser device, etc. For example, a policy could be to isolate access tothe SaaS applications when the user is using an unauthorized device,e.g., outside of the enterprise's control, or when the user is on anopen, untrusted network.

The user device can execute a web browser that loads the image contentutilizing a JavaScript application, and that interacts with the imagecontent with WebSocket. The resources can be the cloud application andthe user device can be one or more of i) located outside an enterprise'snetwork and ii) a non-enterprise device, and the cloud application isprovided in isolation to avoid data exfiltration on the user device. Thedetermining can be performed by a secure web gateway.

The process 1950 can further include persisting a state and session ofthe cloud application in the secure environment, for use after the userdevice logs out and logs back in. The process 1950 can further includereceiving a second request for resources that are one of web content anda cloud application from a user device, wherein the request is a firstrequest; and determining the second request does not require isolation,wherein the first request is rendered in isolation in a first tab of aweb browser and the second request is direct, not in isolation, in asecond tab of the web browser. The process 1950 can further include,subsequent to a logout or exiting a web browser, for the request,destroying the secure environment. The process 1950 can further includereceiving a response to the request in the virtual browser; andconverting the response to the image content.

Browser Isolation Via the Cloud-Based System

FIG. 21 is a diagram of a typical flow for browser isolation with thecloud-based system 100. A user with a user device 300 and a nativebrowser 1402 is monitored inline by the cloud-based system 100 via oneof the enforcement node 150. The user tries to access an uncategorizedwebsite via the enforcement node 150 (step 2002, GET www.unknown.com).For example, the cloud-based system 100 can have a list of allowedwebsites and blocked websites based on various factors and anuncategorized website is one that is not in the list.

The enforcement node 150 evaluates the request against defined policies,and upon a match, the enforcement node 150 redirects the request to aremote browser isolation service 2000 with the original URL appended asa query string (step 2004). The native browser 1402 follows the redirectand make a connection to a browser isolation endpoint, for the remotebrowser isolation service 2000 (step 2006). The remote browser isolationservice 2000 spins up an isolated browser, such as in a container, andmakes a connection to the originally requested webpage (step 2008).Note, this can be direct or via the enforcement node 150.

The isolated browser loads the content including optionally inspectingthe content via the cloud-based system 100 (step 2008). Finally, theloaded web content in the isolated browser is streamed to the nativebrowser 1402 as pixels in an HTML5 stream (step 2010).

Private Application Access with Browser Isolation

The present disclosure includes a combination of private applicationaccess and browser isolation. This allows users to obtain secure accessto the private applications via personal devices (e.g., BYOD) andensuring an airgap between these unmanaged endpoints and the criticalprivate applications. Use cases can include contractors and BYOD forprivate applications and data exfiltration control. Use of the ZTNAsolution reduces the surface area of attack by a large margin. Somecustomers also provide access to some of these critical applications toboth employees using BYOD and contractors. The problem being, theseorganization do not really have access or control over themachines/endpoints used by the users to access these applications. Theusers could essentially be using outdated browsers which have not beenpatched for ages, vulnerable operating systems, lack of adequateendpoint security or outdated security signatures. These securityinadequacies could result in the end machine being compromised andpotentially affecting the internal application being accessed by theuser. This could also lead to confidential data loss from the internalapplication.

The ZTNA solution allows organizations to provide access to theirprivate applications using a Zero trust platform. Adhering the basicconcepts of Zero trust, this approach has no visibility into whatexactly the user does with the application being accessed as the ZTNAsolution does not inspect the data being transferred between the userand the application being accessed. This can be problematic when itcomes to allowing application access to third party contractors and BYODdevices and not being able to restrict users from performing certainactions against the accessed applications. An example of one such actionis that organizations do not want to allow users to download potentiallyconfidential information such as financial records, code snippets, etc.from the private applications down to their personal devices. Thesepersonal devices could be shared devices and downloaded files could beleft on the devices themselves which could result in information leakand misuse. Organizations would like to create policies where they allowdownloads or copying of content from these applications only to theirofficial sanctioned (corporate managed) endpoints and not from BYOD orunsanctioned devices.

FIG. 22 is a flowchart of a process 2050 for private application accesswith browser isolation. The process 2050 can be a computer-implementedmethod, implemented as instructions stored in a computer-readable mediumand executed by one or more processors, or by an apparatus such as theenforcement node 150 or the server 200.

The process 2050 includes, responsive to a request to access anapplication, wherein the application is in one of a public cloud, aprivate cloud, and an enterprise network, and wherein the user device isremote over the Internet, determining if a user of the user device ispermitted to access the application and whether the application shouldbe provided in an isolated browser (step 2052); responsive to thedetermining, creating secure tunnels between the user device, anisolation service operating the isolated browser, and the applicationbased on connection information (step 2054); loading the application inthe isolated browser, via the secure tunnels (step 2056); and providingimage content for the application to the user device, via the securetunnels (step 2058).

The determining whether the application should be provided in theisolated browser can be based on any of whether the user is a contractorand whether the user device is an unmanaged endpoint. The determiningwhether the application should be provided in the isolated browser canbe based on preventing data exfiltration of information in theapplication. The determining can be via a central authority in acloud-based system, and wherein the creating can be based on connectioninformation determined by the central authority.

The creating secure tunnels can be performed by and through acloud-based system that dials out to the user device and theapplication. The process 2050 can further include receiving input fromthe user and through a native browser on the user device, and causingthe input in the isolated browser. The input can be via a JavaScriptapplication on the native browser that sends inputs via a WebSocketchannel.

FIG. 23 is a flow diagram of data flow of web isolation with privateapplication access. The data flow is described from the browser 1402which is authenticated (step 1) via an exporter 2102 (part of thecloud-based system 100) that performs SAML with an authenticationservice provider (AUTHSP) 2104 (step 2) that saves Auth/Context in anobject store 2106 (step 3), e.g., the AUTHSP 2104 inserts SAML assertionin the object store encrypted by a randomly generated key. The exporter2102 redirects the browser 1402 with a query string (step 4). Theexporter 2102 does policy evaluation, selects Cloud Browser Isolation(CBI) profile, determines CBI endpoint and redirects with thisinformation.

The browser 1402 sends the object store reference and key to the browserisolation service 2000 (step 5), i.e., a context is sent to the CBI. Thecontext is: object store reference(cookie), decryption key(cryptcookie)and original URL. The CBI profile selected forms part of the CBI domain.The browser isolation service 2000 retrieves a context for the user(step 6) and will use this information to retrieve the full user contextfrom the object store and use the profile to create an isolationcontainer. The browser isolation service 2000 requests a certificate forthe customer (step 7), such as via a management API, a central authoritynode 152, etc. Finally, the browser isolation service 2000 providesaccess to a private application such as through a broker 2110. The usercontext with the SAML assertion, etc. is provided to the ZPA clientrunning within the Isolation container which establishes a tunnel to thebroker and follows the normal ZPA access workflow.

CONCLUSION

It will be appreciated that some embodiments described herein mayinclude one or more generic or specialized processors (“one or moreprocessors”) such as microprocessors; Central Processing Units (CPUs);Digital Signal Processors (DSPs): customized processors such as NetworkProcessors (NPs) or Network Processing Units (NPUs), Graphics ProcessingUnits (GPUs), or the like; Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs); andthe like along with unique stored program instructions (including bothsoftware and firmware) for control thereof to implement, in conjunctionwith certain non-processor circuits, some, most, or all of the functionsof the methods and/or systems described herein. Alternatively, some orall functions may be implemented by a state machine that has no storedprogram instructions, or in one or more Application Specific IntegratedCircuits (ASICs), in which each function or some combinations of certainof the functions are implemented as custom logic or circuitry. Ofcourse, a combination of the aforementioned approaches may be used. Forsome of the embodiments described herein, a corresponding device such ashardware, software, firmware, and a combination thereof can be referredto as “circuitry configured or adapted to,” “logic configured or adaptedto,” etc. perform a set of operations, steps, methods, processes,algorithms, functions, techniques, etc. as described herein for thevarious embodiments.

Moreover, some embodiments may include a non-transitorycomputer-readable storage medium having computer readable code storedthereon for programming a computer, server, appliance, device,processor, circuit, etc. each of which may include a processor toperform functions as described and claimed herein. Examples of suchcomputer-readable storage mediums include, but are not limited to, ahard disk, an optical storage device, a magnetic storage device, a ROM(Read Only Memory), a PROM (Programmable Read Only Memory), an EPROM(Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory), an EEPROM (ElectricallyErasable Programmable Read Only Memory), Flash memory, and the like.When stored in the non-transitory computer readable medium, software caninclude instructions executable by a processor or device (e.g., any typeof programmable circuitry or logic) that, in response to such execution,cause a processor or the device to perform a set of operations, steps,methods, processes, algorithms, functions, techniques, etc. as describedherein for the various embodiments.

Although the present disclosure has been illustrated and describedherein with reference to preferred embodiments and specific examplesthereof, it will be readily apparent to those of ordinary skill in theart that other embodiments and examples may perform similar functionsand/or achieve like results. All such equivalent embodiments andexamples are within the spirit and scope of the present disclosure, arecontemplated thereby, and are intended to be covered by the followingclaims. Moreover, it is noted that the various elements, operations,steps, methods, processes, algorithms, functions, techniques, etc.,described herein can be used in any and all combinations with eachother.

What is claimed is:
 1. A method comprising: responsive to a request toaccess an application, wherein the application is in one of a publiccloud, a private cloud, and an enterprise network, and wherein the userdevice is remote over the Internet, determining if a user of the userdevice is permitted to access the application and whether theapplication should be provided in an isolated browser; responsive to thedetermining, creating secure tunnels between the user device, anisolation service operating the isolated browser, and the applicationbased on connection information; loading the application in the isolatedbrowser, via the secure tunnels; and providing image content for theapplication to the user device, via the secure tunnels.
 2. The method ofclaim 1, wherein the determining whether the application should beprovided in the isolated browser is based on any of whether the user isa contractor and whether the user device is an unmanaged endpoint. 3.The method of claim 1, wherein the determining whether the applicationshould be provided in the isolated browser is based on preventing dataexfiltration of information in the application.
 4. The method of claim1, wherein the determining is via a central authority in a cloud-basedsystem, and wherein the creating is based on connection informationdetermined by the central authority.
 5. The method of claim 1, whereinthe creating secure tunnels is performed by and through a cloud-basedsystem that dials out to the user device and the application.
 6. Themethod of claim 1, further comprising receiving input from the user andthrough a native browser on the user device, and causing the input inthe isolated browser.
 7. The method of claim 6, wherein the input is viaa JavaScript application on the native browser that sends inputs via aWebSocket channel.
 8. A non-transitory computer-readable mediumcomprising instructions that, when executed, cause a user device toperform the steps of: responsive to a request to access an application,wherein the application is in one of a public cloud, a private cloud,and an enterprise network, and wherein the user device is remote overthe Internet, determining if a user of the user device is permitted toaccess the application and whether the application should be provided inan isolated browser; responsive to the determining, creating securetunnels between the user device, an isolation service operating theisolated browser, and the application based on connection information;loading the application in the isolated browser, via the secure tunnels;and providing image content for the application to the user device, viathe secure tunnels.
 9. The non-transitory computer-readable medium ofclaim 8, wherein the determining whether the application should beprovided in the isolated browser is based on any of whether the user isa contractor and whether the user device is an unmanaged endpoint. 10.The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 8, wherein thedetermining whether the application should be provided in the isolatedbrowser is based on preventing data exfiltration of information in theapplication.
 11. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 8,wherein the determining is via a central authority in a cloud-basedsystem, and wherein the creating is based on connection informationdetermined by the central authority.
 12. The non-transitorycomputer-readable medium of claim 8, wherein the creating secure tunnelsis performed by and through a cloud-based system that dials out to theuser device and the application.
 13. The non-transitorycomputer-readable medium of claim 8, wherein the steps include receivinginput from the user and through a native browser on the user device, andcausing the input in the isolated browser.
 14. The non-transitorycomputer-readable medium of claim 13, wherein the input is via aJavaScript application on the native browser that sends inputs via aWebSocket channel.
 15. A cloud-based system comprising: one or more nodeconfigured to responsive to a request to access an application, whereinthe application is in one of a public cloud, a private cloud, and anenterprise network, and wherein the user device is remote over theInternet, determine if a user of the user device is permitted to accessthe application and whether the application should be provided in anisolated browser, responsive to a determination the user is permittedand the application should be provided in an isolated browser, createsecure tunnels between the user device, an isolation service operatingthe isolated browser, and the application based on connectioninformation, load the application in the isolated browser, via thesecure tunnels, and provide image content for the application to theuser device, via the secure tunnels.
 16. The cloud-based system of claim15, wherein the determination whether the application should be providedin the isolated browser is based on any of whether the user is acontractor and whether the user device is an unmanaged endpoint.
 17. Thecloud-based system of claim 15, wherein the determination whether theapplication should be provided in the isolated browser is based onpreventing data exfiltration of information in the application.
 18. Thecloud-based system of claim 15, wherein the determination is via acentral authority in a cloud-based system, and wherein the creating isbased on connection information determined by the central authority. 19.The cloud-based system of claim 15, wherein the secure tunnels arecreated where the cloud-based system that dials out to the user deviceand the application.
 20. The cloud-based system of claim 15, wherein theisolated browser is configured to receive input from the user andthrough a native browser on the user device, and causing the input inthe isolated browser.